NOT DELIVERING THE GOODS
A
spokesman for the fertility industry found “a lot to like” the President’s
Bioethics Council’s Reproduction and Responsibility (2004). It’s little wonder. The Council calls for
very little change in the status quo regarding this enterprise, while the very
profitable beat goes on. And speeds
up.
The
report is little more than bioethics as consumer protection. Chiefly, the Council observes that the $4
billion/year (and growing, given insurance subsidies) fertility industry operates with almost no
governmental oversight. The Council
suggests almost no new limitations. Instead, it recommends the gathering of
more information so that, ultimately, consumers get what they are paying for:
goods of merchantable quality.
More
(and more longitudinal) studies-- “voluntary, of course--” are recommended to
assess the health impacts of ART on adults and, especially, on children, to
follow up on earlier studies that show, e.g., that 9% of IVF offspring have
major birth defects and 25% are born prematurely and 30% have low
birthweight. Yet, to the extent that
concern about reprotech arises from its effects on children later born thereof,
a dilemma is presented: if American law does not recognize the personhood of
the pre-term child, can government act on behalf of someone who does not exist?
Almost
no attention is given to the perceptual and social impacts of ART. In the
Council’s view, if it pleases individuals and doesn’t cause major health
problems, ART is worthy, because it supplies important the important “good” of “biologically
related children.” While the Council
assumes that the desire to have biological children fundamentally trumps all other
considerations, it fails to consider the possibility that this desire is
contextually conditional; if reproduction were an existential imperative,
childless people could never be happy.
Moreover, the “basic drive” view does not explain why many of the
infertile have very actively suppressed the drive to bear children at a more
physically appropriate age.
Using
the Council’s standards, such ventures as television, inner-directed real
estate development, Internet porn and the car culture would be support-worthy
because they fulfill individual wishes with relatively few, immediately
observable health effects. In a recent
newspaper profile of Celine Dion, the singer breezily notes that she has a “little
iceberg” frozen in an IVF clinic that she will have implanted in three years,
when she finishes her current Vegas gig.
Presumably, the Council would applaud the exercise of freedom that
animates this story.
The
Council gives almost no regard to the impacts of reprotech on the way people
perceive themselves, and others, and interact. One panel member asks--
ostensibly rhetorically-- if Americans feel diminished by the cloning of
embryos in South Korea. Clearly, many do
not. However, many never hear and/or are
similarly unmoved by reports of starvation in the Sudan, Cambodians stepping on
land mines or public bombings in Russia, Israel, Colombia or even Lower
Manhattan. Plainly, many struggle enough
to put one foot in front of the other, especially in a world that has already
imposed so many challenges to finding human meaning.
Yet,
many others are bothered by activities, such as human destruction and
commodification, that do not immediately and measurably affect their
health. Although no H-bombs or ICBMs
fell on people between 1960-1990, the existence of nuclear arsenals undeniably
darkened human moods. To use another
example, if the U.S. undertook a Ceaucescu-style architectural renewal program
by tearing down all of its pre-War buildings and replacing them with drab
concrete, glass and steel, that would profoundly affect the human spirit,
albeit in an unmeasurable way. Does
everyone who thinks about the larger world storm the barricades? Or are their reactions more subtle: do they
drink heavily, take Paxil, feel less guilty about mistreating others, while
unknowingly embracing nihilism? Codes
regarding professionals’-- or gang members’-- wearing of uniforms and
proscriptions of profanity or hate speech reflect a long list of limitations on
conduct that does not cause physical harm but is believed to affect human
relations. Using individual, medical health as the unit and scope of analysis
is a dangerously narrow research model.
The
Council opposes efforts to end, or even regulate, practices such as gamete
sales and mass-scale cold storage of embryos.
But the Council’s failure to use consistent standards in its analysis
becomes apparent when it expresses concern that “someday,” ART may turn
life into “manufacture” and may distort familial relationships. IVF fits squarely within the made by hand,
mass-scale, profit-driven, quality control definition and model of
manufacture. Sperm and egg sales and
surrogacy do, too, and these also grossly distort family relations. The Council’s
willingness to rationalize via creative language becomes darkly comical when
the Council observes that sperm and egg sellers are not paid for their “product”
but, rather, for their “time” and “effort.”
Aside from ignoring what’s plainly going on in the masturbatorium, does
that mean a guy who goes to a sperm bank and, despite “effort,” fails to
generate “product” would still be paid?
Beyond
that, the Council reasons that these measures, and IVF, have been used for long
enough that they are fait accompli, with established constituencies, and that,
therefore, efforts to curb these practices would be uncomfortably “controversial.” But isn’t nearly every issue reported in the
news controversial? And isn’t the function of government to address that which
is controversial? Or does it reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of American
government to so suggest? i.e., is the
government supposed to either avoid or at least, pretend to address,
that which is disturbing or dysfunctional, while actually declining to
meaningfully do so?
Moreover,
the notion that practices are immune from regulation because they have been
occurring for a while defies acceptance. Virtually all conduct that is
proscribed by law had been occurring for an extended period before it was
banned. The validity of legislation is
not diminished by the continuation of such activity-- though presumably to a
lesser degree-- after it has been proscribed.
Using the Council’s rationale, should there have been no opposition to
the Vietnam War beyond the mid-sixties because it had been going on for a while
before that? Should the Iraq War
continue indefinitely because, hey, we’ve got the materiel there?
Neither
of the foregoing reasons for a permissive approach to reprotech, namely
controversy or established practice, explains how the governments of Italy and
Canada and the European Parliament have recently enacted broad reprotech
limits. The Council suggests that
American legal system differs from some others in that “liberty” interests are
emphasized and the concept of “dignity” is not to be found. But, in this context, how could the Council
justify any of even the modest limits suggested by the Council below? Each would constrain liberty in the name of
dignity.
The
Council congratulates itself for reaching consensus on some issues.
They urge a ban on the following activities: implanting human embryos
into animal wombs; the production of a human-animal hybrid by fertilization of
human eggs with animal sperm or vice versa; the transfer of a human embryo to a
woman’s uterus for any purpose except to attempt to perform a live birth;
attempts to conceive a child by fusing blastomeres from two or more embryos, or
from gametes from the aborted or embryonic stem cells; experiments of embryos
older than 14 days and the buying and selling of embryos. This list is hardly ambitious.
The
Council never asks why so many have come to rely on the infertility
treatment. There is no consideration of
infertility’s socially and self-induced basis: most of those seeking treatment
have postponed childbearing until their prime reproductive years have passed,
and a large percentage have scarring from STDs or abortion. The Council’s
unwillingness to consider the etiology of infertility may stem from its
insular, academic and professional demographic: in the academic and
professional world, postponed childbearing has become a cultural norm. More unbiased research and, especially,
publicity, is needed infertility’s cause.
If multiple partner sexual histories and contraceptive-driven
postponement of commitment have reproductive consequences, shouldn’t the public
be made aware of this, as has wisely been done regarding other public health
issues, such as tobacco use? In a culture glutted with sexual messages, is
sexual responsibility too indelicate to discuss?
Finally, regarding responsibility, the crisply alliterative title does not reflect the text. The book does not explain what responsibility is owed to whom or why. Overall, this is a very disappointing work. Although it is touted as a starting point, the Council’s laissez-faire orientation and its low regard for unborn life seem to ensure that any subsequent analysis would be similarly tepid and, by then, even more untimely.