DOING THE DOZENS
In
Human Dignity in the Biotech Century (2004), twelve Christian writers
discuss the impact of biotechnologies on human life and the human spirit. They point out that our society must address
an array of scientific developments various topics, which can be roughly broken
into three categories: taking life through abortion (including eugenic
abortion after genetic screening), infanticide, DNR orders, assisted suicide
and euthanasia (the latter three topics are not written about), making life
through IVF, gamete sales, posthumous reproduction, surrogate motherhood,
cloning, embryonic stem cell research (“ESCR”) and genetic engineering, and faking
life with nanotechnology, cybernetics (mind control), neurological
manipulation, transgenics and transhumanism.
Most
of the authors present overtly Christian perspectives on these topics. Several point out that efforts to change the
nature of the human body separate humans from the imago Dei, i.e., God’s image,
and Christ, who took human form. Nigel
Cameron notes that few Christians have been involved in public discussion or
activism regarding these issues because, for a long time, many affirmatively
disengaged from the secular world, and many others are, by bearing, pietistic
and passive. He also states that ethical
analyses are difficult because goods and evils are often incommensurable.
Unsurprisingly,
C.S. Lewis’ The Abolition of Man is cited by several authors. Lewis
observed that once we abandon the Tao, i.e., the universal truth about right and wrong, the
relativistic Conditioners, with their focus on individuals, will shape
existence. Biotechnologies are important
tools for relativism and the turning of man into a project and a product. Charles Colson observes that the utilitarian
(“the greatest good for the greatest number”) approach to human life advanced
by, inter alia, John Stuart Mill and Christopher Reeve, does not hold up
empirically. If it did, Mr. Reeve would
not have been kept alive, at great expense and effort, for many years after he
was injured. Instead, Colson argues, government’s purpose is to protect the
weak from the strong.
The
subject matters of the chapters overlap to some degree. Perhaps because of its timeliness, several
authors discuss ESCR. As with many other
issues, terminology is important. ESCR
is said by advocates to use “pre-embryos,” even though that term is not
recognized in the most authoritative embryology texts. ESCR is also contrasted to the other “stem
cell research,” namely adult stem cell research. Moreover, even cloning is dressed up as
somatic cell nuclear transfer (“SCNT”) and cloning can be either “reproductive”
or “therapeutic.”
Dr.
David Prentice observes several practical impediments to the efficacy of ESCR,
from the low (less than one in ten) yield of cell lines from embryos, to
uncontrolled growth of embryonic cells into different types of tissue or
tumors, to rejection because of its genetic dissimilarity to that of the
recipient. To address the latter
problem, some advocate for “therapeutic” cloning (some opponents call this the “clone
and kill” approach), so that an individual can create embryonic cells that
match their own genes. However, even if
this were possible, as Wesley Smith notes, the numbers just don’t add up: 800 million human eggs would be needed as
growth media for the therapeutic clones needed to treat the 16 million American
diabetics alone.
Paige
Cunningham, the author of a chapter on anti-abortion activism, notes that the
sovereignty of adults over the birth of children has become so deeply
internalized that strategies to defeat abortion must be based not on the status
of the unborn but, instead, on arguments that show it’s bad for women. In Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992), the Supreme Court
justified abortion on the basis that our society has grown used to it. It
wrote: “For two decades of economic and social developments, people have
organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of
themselves and their places in society in reliance on the availability of
abortion in the event that contraception should fail.” Is there a more disturbing, less compelling
justification in American jurisprudence?
Christopher
Hook’s chapter on nanotechnology (molecular level methods of controlling or
harnessing biological and chemical processes) and cybernetics (behavioral and
cognitive control or enhancement through, e.g., computer chip implants) and
transhumanism (transitional beings, part human, part machine) presents a primer
on these much research-subsidized, seldom-discussed topics. To the extent these devices work, they will
enable some to outsee, outrun, outthink, out-remember, generally outperform
and/or outlive others. Moreover, these
unnatural technologies could run amok.
For example, if technologies can be derived to destroy cancer cells, it
would seem that they could also be designed, as weapons, to destroy normal
cells. Or the “gray goo” scenario could
develop: experimentation could create organisms that would destroy natural
organisms in an uncontrollable series of reactions.
Dr.
David Stevens instructs that 95% of DNA is not genes, but, rather, material
with no obvious function. Moreover,
comparing DNA to a music CD, he says that although all cells have a full
complement of each person’s DNA, the cells of each of the 210 kinds of tissue
use only the DNA “track” that applies that cell’s function.
Several
authors discuss the Nazis’ Operation T4, a 1940-41 program in which over 70,000 disabled persons were
exterminated. They also discuss the numerous cruel experiments that the Nazis
performed on human subjects and note that many of these were ostensibly
undertaken to save lives, though, obviously, not those of the subjects.
The
authors call for people to learn about these topics and to avoid Luddism,
though they don’t provide a clear sense of where Luddism ends and technomania
begins. In urging the acceptance of some
biotech because of its potential to extend earthly life, Christian transcendence seems muted. In any
event, the authors urge the building of coalitions with other groups (including
some traditional adversaries) and activism but are not specific about what forms
of activism would be most suitable.